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Social interaction plays an important role in human life. While there are instances that
require cooperation, there are others that force people to compete rather than to
cooperate, in order to achieve certain goals. A key question is how the deployment
of attention differs between cooperative and competitive situation; however, empirical
investigations have yielded inconsistent results. By manipulating the (in-)dependence
of individuals via performance-contingent incentives, in a visual go–nogo Simon task
the current study aimed at improving our understanding of complementary task
performance in a joint action context. In the independent condition each participant
received what s/he achieves; in the cooperative condition each participant received the
half of what both achieved, and in the competitive condition participants were instructed
that the winner takes it all. Extending previous findings, we found sequential processing
adjustments of the Simon effect as a function of the interdependency (i.e., competition,
cooperation) and transition between (i.e., go–nogo requirements) interacting individuals.
While sequential processing adjustments of the Simon effect in both the competition
and cooperation condition were unaffected when alternating between responsible
actors (i.e., nogo–go transition), sequential processing adjustments were enlarged
under competition for repeating responsibilities of one and the same actor (i.e., go–
go transitions). In other words, the prospect of performance-contingent reward in a
competitive context exclusively impacts flexible behavioral adjustments of one’s own
actions. Rather than fostering the consideration and differentiation of the other actor,
pushing one’s own performance to the limit appears to be the suitable strategy in
competitive instances of complementary tasks. Therefore, people keep their eyes on
themselves when aiming at beating a co-actor and emerging as the winner.
Keywords: joint action, go–nogo Simon task, reward, cooperation and competition, sequential processing
adjustments, referential coding
INTRODUCTION
For humans, it is nearly impossible not to interact with others (Watzlawick et al., 1967). Beyond
the significant role of exchanging information and communicating with each other, there are many
instances in everyday life that require cooperation (e.g., carrying a table together), while there are
others that force people to compete in order to achieve a certain goal (e.g., career position, success
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in nearly any kind of sport). Although any of those instances are
quite familiar to all of us, the question arises: When and to what
extent (if anything) do we consider the other person’s actions
during social interaction?
Experimental approaches aiming at investigating the
underlying mechanisms of social interactions in the laboratory
typically use the Simon task (Craft and Simon, 1970). In the
standard, two-choice version of the Simon task, participants are
asked to respond with a left or right keypress to a particular
feature of the stimulus (e.g., the color blue or green), which
randomly appears to the left or right side of the screen. If
the spatial location of the stimulus corresponds with the
spatial location of the assigned response (i.e., compatible
trial), responses are typically faster and less error prone. In
contrast, if the spatial location of the stimulus and the assigned
response differ (i.e., incompatible trial), response times (RTs)
and error-rates (ERs) increase. The difference between RTs or
ERs in incompatible and compatible trials is called the Simon
effect (cf. Simon and Rudell, 1967; for an overview, see Simon,
1990; Lu and Proctor, 1995). This Stimulus–Response (S–R)
compatibility effect is typically explained by the dimensional
overlap model (Kornblum et al., 1990), which concerns the
effect of a match between the task-irrelevant feature of the
stimulus (i.e., location) and the required response (i.e., left/right
location). Accordingly, the location of the stimulus is assumed to
automatically activate a spatially corresponding response, which
facilitates task performance on compatible trials and impairs
performance on incompatible trials, because resolving the
conflict between automatically activated and required responses
takes time.
To investigate social interactions, Sebanz et al. (2003)
distributed the Simon task among two individuals. Accordingly,
each participant was responsible for one stimulus color by
operating his/her assigned response-key, while sitting on one
side of the screen, converting the two-choice Simon task into
a joint go–nogo task. In order to investigate the impact of
performing the go–nogo task together with another person,
Sebanz et al. (2003) had participants carry out the same go–
nogo Simon task individually, thus in the absence of the partner
(i.e., individual go–nogo task). While there was no significant
S–R compatibility effect in the individual go–nogo condition,
there was a compatibility effect when two participants performed
the same go–nogo Simon task together, and this finding became
known as the social or joint go–nogo Simon effect (JSE; Sebanz
et al., 2003; for a review, see Dolk et al., 2014). Interestingly, even
though the other person’s (or one’s own nogo) action typically
has no direct consequence for the continuation of the experiment
(as it simply offers no additional information to facilitate one’s
own performance), the mere perception (or expectation) of an
alternative action in the joint but not in the individual go–nogo
condition seems to impact one’s own task performance. In other
words, while it would be an appropriate strategy to concentrate
on one’s own task exclusively and completely ignore everything
else, people seem unable to do so as soon as there are other
(attention attracting) action events in the environment. Thus, the
(social) task context seems to modulate the allocation of attention
toward the specific S–R associations (cf. Baess and Prinz, 2015).
Accordingly, signifying the spatial S–R assignments reintroduces
a dimensional overlap of the corresponding dimensions, thereby
facilitating (S–R match) or impairing (S–R mismatch) task
performance in the joint condition, whereas the lack of an
alternative action to one’s own in the individual condition
eliminates the need for spatial response coding and thus, there
is no dimensional overlap of spatial S–R features.
This explanation nicely fits with the existing theoretical
frameworks aiming to explain the emergence of JSEs: The
action co-representation (Sebanz et al., 2003) and the referential
coding account (Dolk et al., 2013; for spatially inspired
accounts, see Guagnano et al., 2010; Dittrich et al., 2012).
Grounded in the deeply social nature of human beings, the
action co-representation account assumes that one’s own
actions and others’ actions are (automatically) represented in
a functionally equivalent way. Accordingly, spatially assigned
stimuli and responses of the whole task set are considered to
be represented, which facilitates task performance in cases of
an S–R match, but interferes with performance when there
is an S–R mismatch. Based on the Theory of Event Coding
(TEC; Hommel et al., 2001), the referential coding account
in contrast holds that actions are cognitively represented by
codes of their perceivable effects. Given that self- and other-
generated actions are represented by the same kind of effect
codes, the representation referring to one’s own action needs to
be discriminated from all concurrently activated representations
in order for the individual to behave appropriately in a given
context. Emphasizing the spatial nature of one’s own action as
left/right in reference to the other person’s action provides not
only a powerful strategy to differentiate alternative action events,
it also reintroduces the dimension overlap of spatially defined
S–R features. Consequentially, discriminating alternative action
events should be more challenging the more similar those events
are, resulting in varying effect sizes with varying degrees of
similarity (i.e., more similar = larger JSE). These assumptions
nicely converge with previous findings showing increased (non-
social and social) JSEs with increasing similarity of alternative
action events: e.g., HumanRomantic−Partner > HumanFriend
(Quintard et al., 2018), HumanIngroup > HumanOutgroup (Iani
et al., 2011; Müller et al., 2011), Human > Puppet (Tsai
and Brass, 2007), Human > Computer (Tsai et al., 2008),
RobotHuman−like > RobotMachine−like (Stenzel et al., 2012);
Japanese waving cat > Clock > Metronome (Dolk et al., 2013).
Thus, while social variables appear to play an influential
role for the co-representation account, the referential coding
account highlights the role of the similarity between alternative
action events irrespective of its (non-)social nature. In both
cases, however, attention allocation toward the spatially distinct
alternative actions seem to impact the cognitive representation
thereof and, what is more, subsequent behavior (for an attentional
focusing account of joint compatibility effects, see Dittrich
et al., 2017). This brings the introductory question back into
play: When and to what extent do individuals take other
people’s (i.e., alternative) actions into account or in other words,
which situations require the discrimination of self- and other-
generated events? One straightforward approach to tackling
this issue is to manipulate the relationship between, or the
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interdependence of, interacting individuals. While the offending
behavior of an intimidating confederate reduced the JSE as
compared to a friendly co-actor (Hommel et al., 2009), other
studies manipulated the interdependence or in-/dependence
of interacting individuals by inducing a more cooperative or
competitive relationship via incentives (Ruys and Aarts, 2010;
Iani et al., 2011; Ruissen and de Bruijn, 2016).
Using an auditory joint go–nogo Simon task (i.e., reacting to
the pitch of a sound), Ruys and Aarts (2010) investigated three
reward manipulations to induce different relationships between
participants. In advance of the Simon task, participants were
instructed that either: (i) the ten best performing subjects will
win ten euros (independent group), (ii) each actor of the five
best performing teams will earn five euros (cooperative group),
or (iii) ten team winners will be randomly selected for the ten
euros reward (competition group). Results revealed a larger JSE
in the dependent groups (i.e., the cooperative and competitive
groups), in comparison to the independent group. This finding
has been taken to suggest that interdependency leads to a stronger
attentional focus on the partner, and therefore to stronger shared
representations and to a larger JSE. Iani et al. (2011) improved
the definition of competition by instructing participants that each
actor of the best performing team will be rewarded with five
euros in the cooperative group, or that only the team winner
will receive five euros as a reward in the competitive group. In
sharp contrast to Ruys and Aarts (2010), the results revealed a
significant difference between dependent groups, with a JSE in
the cooperative group but no JSE in the competitive group. Thus,
considering the co-actor might selectively occur when aiming
to beat others as a team, but the exact opposite takes place
when having an opponent. Further support for the crucial role
of the exact type of interdependency is provided by a study of
Ruissen and de Bruijn (2016) showing a smaller JSE in a group of
participants that played Tetris in a competitive as compared to a
cooperative (or isolated, i.e., solo) style of social interaction prior
to the joint go–nogo Simon task performance.
Even though previous findings suggest more attention to
the other’s actions in a cooperative compared to a competitive
relationship, there are several methodological issues that warrant
further investigation in order to fully understand the processes
that drive these socially driven flexible adjustments of attention
allocation. In addition to investigating go–nogo Simon task
performance in an independent, cooperative and competitive
joint condition, the present study made use of an individual
go–nogo task at the beginning of the experiment to provide
a valuable reference for the resulting JSEs. Furthermore, the
definitions of the terms cooperation and competition were
further adjusted from those used by Iani et al. (2011). Here,
cooperation instructions emphasize team work for achieving
a common goal (and not a cooperative competition against
unspecified others as in Iani et al., 2011), while competition
instructions more clearly highlight the battle of opponents (i.e.,
the winner takes it all) to achieve the individual goal of emerging
as the winner. To further amplify the effect of interactive contexts,
reward was given for every (correct and fast enough) trial.
More importantly, however, the present study followed the
recommendation of Liepelt et al. (2013) in taking sequential
processing adjustments (i.e., trial-by-trial dependencies) in go–
nogo Simon task performance into account to achieve a more
detailed picture of the underlying processes (cf. Liepelt et al.,
2013). That is, compatibility effects like Flanker, Simon, and
Stroop are typically smaller after incompatible compared to
compatible trials (Gratton et al., 1992; for a review, see Egner,
2014). This conflict adaptation or Gratton effect is considered
to reflect reduced interference as a consequence of cognitive
control already being up-regulated in the trial following an
incompatible (conflicting) trial (Botvinick et al., 2001; for a
review, see Botvinick, 2007). Liepelt et al. (2011) emphasized
this effect in an individual and joint go–nogo Simon task, while
highlighting the role of sequential processing adjustments for
different types of trial-to-trial transitions. These can either be
(i) nogo–go transitions, where the participant had to withhold
a response in the previous trial but is required to respond
in the current trial, or (ii) a go–go transition, in which the
participant was required to respond in both the previous
and the current trial. Interestingly, while sequential adaptation
effects were stronger for nogo–go transitions than for go–
go transitions in both tasks, these where overall smaller in
the individual go–nogo task suggesting additional between-
person discrimination (i.e., whose turn is it?) processes in the
course of a nogo–go transition (Liepelt et al., 2011; Yamaguchi
et al., 2016). For the present study, those transition effects
are particularly interesting as they can indicate changes of
the attentional focus, by signifying differences in sequential
processing adjustments after one’s own compared to the partner’s
response. Considering a positive to neutral and thus, rather
cooperative style when engaged in social interactions with
others as default (Iani et al., 2011), constantly attending to
the partner’s action enables flexible adjustments to the other
in order to achieve the common goal together. The critical
question, however, is whether and (if any) to which extent
participants’ attention is drawn to one’s own or the other’s
performance in competitive interactive contexts. In other words,
do participants in a competitive relationship apply a self- or
other-referenced focus (Poortvliet and Darnon, 2010). While the
latter is suggested to be applied when aiming to outperform the
other, the former might be more suitable in particular (task)
circumstances in which constant monitoring and comparing
one’s own and the others performance is quite demanding, thus
resource-consuming. That is, attending to the co-actors’ action
might simply not be an appropriate strategy for participants
who are trying to improve their own performance, because they
have little to no direct influence on changing their opponent’s
actions in a go–nogo Simon task. The only thing they can
influence in such a situation is their own action, which should
result in a self-referenced focus (Iani et al., 2011), leading to no
reliable nogo–go, but notable go–go transition effects, because
they refer to sequential processing adjustments after one’s own
response.
Based on this framework, the present study investigated
the processes underlying flexible adjustments to the contextual
challenge of either cooperating or competing for reward when
interacting with others. To that end, participants performed
an individual go–nogo Simon task at the beginning of the
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TABLE 1 | Procedure of an experimental session.
Session and experimental setupa Reward manipulation
Task 1 Individual go–nogo Simon task
– Participants are seated on separate computers
(Figure 1A)
– Each participant responds to only one assigned stimulus
Individual baseline
– No reward manipulation
– Determination of individual RT thresholds for performance-contingent reward in the
following tasks
Task 2 Independent joint go–nogo Simon task
– Both participants are seated in front of the same
computer (Figure 1B)
– Each participant responds to only one assigned stimulus
Independent performance-contingent reward
– Each correct and fast enough trial is rewarded with 4 cents
– An incorrect response is punished with a loss of 2 cents that is credited to the other
participant
– Each participant gets the amount of money s/he earned on her/his own (independent
goal)
Task 3 Dependent joint go–nogo Simon task
– Both participants are seated in front of the same
computer (Figure 1B)
– Each participant responds to only one assigned stimulus
Competition:
Dependent performance-contingent reward
– Each correct and fast enough trial is rewarded with 4 cents
– An incorrect response is punished with a loss of 2 cents that is credited to the other
participant




– Each correct and fast enough trial is rewarded with 4 cents
– An incorrect response is punished with a loss of 2 cents - The total amount of reward is
equally divided between both participants (competitive goal)
aTasks 1 and 2 comprised one training block of 16 trials and two testing blocks of 128 trials each, while Task 3 contained only two testing blocks of 128 trials each.
experiment followed by a go–nogo joint Simon task with the
prospect of reward that was largely independent of the co-actor’s
performance. That is, prior to the joint go–nogo Simon task,
participants were instructed that each participant in the pair
would receive the amount of reward that s/he actually earned
for fast and correct responses on their own (i.e., maximizing
my own reward irrespective of the co-actor; independent goal).
Prior to the final part of the experiment participants were
informed that the amount of reward will be equally divided
between both participants (i.e., maximizing the total reward
sum together with the co-actor; shared goal = cooperation)
or that the participant that earned the most reward will
receive the whole amount of reward, including the amount
earned by the other person (i.e., being better than the co-
actor to win and not to lose in the end the whole reward
sum; competitive goal; see Table 1 for an overview of the
experimental procedure). If participants in the competition
group develop an other-referenced focus, we would expect
larger JSEs and sequential processing adjustments after nogo–
go transitions compared to the cooperative group. On the
other side, if participants in the competitive group apply a
self-referenced focus, they should show a smaller JSE, and
larger adjustments after go–go transitions compared to the
cooperative group. Results in the individual go–nogo Simon
task and the independent joint go–nogo Simon task should
be in line with previous findings showing no go–nogo Simon
effect but significant sequential processing adjustment in the




Forty-eight right-handed undergraduate students of the
University of Regensburg (44 female; Mage = 19.7, SDage = 1.9,
Rage = 18–28 years) participated in the present study.1,2
Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
were naive with regard to the hypothesis of the experiment.
Participants gave their written informed consent before their
inclusion in the study in accordance with the ethical standards
of the German Psychological Society (DGPs; 2016) and the
1964 Declaration of Helsinki. According to the DGP’s ethics
1In order to select the sample size, we entered Experiment 2 of the study by Iani
et al. (2011) into the following website https://designingexperiments.shinyapps.io/
BUCSS_ss_power_spa/. Considering the design (i.e., two-factor mixed ANOVA),
sample-size (i.e., N = 32), observed F-value (i.e., F = 8.82), number of levels for
between-subjects (i.e., two) and within-subjects factors (i.e., two), the effect of
interest (i.e., the interaction between both factors), the alpha-level for the previous
and current study (i.e., both 0.05), a desired level of assurance of 0.5 (i.e., correcting
for publication bias) as well as a desired level of statistical power of 0.8 revealed a
sample size of 21 participants per group. However, based on the findings by Liepelt
et al. (2011) for sequential trial-by-trial adjustments using 24, we decided to also
test 24 participants per group.
2The difference between the number of male and female participants could
bias the internal validity of the present study. Given, however, that most
studies investigating the influence of interdependency on go–nogo Simon task
performance had comparable female samples (i.e., Ruissen and de Bruijn,
2016: 92%; Hommel et al., 2009: 89%) and the fact that the manipulation of
interdependency can be considered to be more effective in males as compared
to females (Van Vugt et al., 2007), the impact of the present unbalanced gender-
sample should (if any) further strengthen the present results in a balanced
gender-sample.
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup in the individual go–nogo Simon task (Task 1;
A) and in the joint go–nogo Simon tasks (Tasks 2 and 3; B). In both go–nogo
Simon task contexts (A,B) the participants are required to respond to their
assigned stimulus (blue circle, person on the right, incompatible trial; green
circle, person on the left, compatible trial) by operating the response key in
front of them. Stimulus–Response assignments as well as spatial position of
the participants were counterbalanced across participants but held constant
across the tasks. Whereas in the individual go–nogo Simon task (1; A)
participants worked on adjacent computers, in the joint go–nogo Simon tasks
(2 and 3; B) both participants sat in front of one computer.
commission, an institutional research board’s ethical approval is
only required if (i) research carries additional risk beyond daily
activities or (ii) any funding is subject to such an ethical review.
No such requirements were present for this study. After the
session, all participants were debriefed and rewarded with partial
course credit. Participants were tested in pairs and did not know
each other prior to the experiment. Data from three participants
were excluded due to mean reaction times or error rates of more
than 2.5 SDs from the task mean.
Material and Procedure
For the present go–nogo Simon tasks, a green and a blue
circle with a diameter of one centimeter were used as stimuli
(0.96◦ × 0.96◦; cf. Hommel et al., 2009). They were presented
8.75 cm to the left or the right of the center (eccentricity of
8.7◦ visual angle) using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools,
Sharpsburg, PA, United States).
Upon arrival at the laboratory, pairs of participants were
informed about the three consecutive segments of the
experiment, namely performing the first task alone and the
following two together with the other person. Prior to the
instruction phase of the first (an individual go–nogo Simon)
task, both participants were seated at their respective workspaces
composed of two seats in front of a computer with a 17-
inch monitor (display resolution at 1,024 × 768 pixels) at a
viewing distance of approximately 60 cm (Figure 1A). To
enable a consistent spatial arrangement of left/right chair
and corresponding response across all tasks, participants
in Task 1 sat back-to-back leaving the second chair at each
workspace empty. That is, while the participant assigned to
the left workspace was seated in the left chair and responded
via the left response key (i.e., the “Y”-key on a QWERTZ-
keyboard), the participant assigned to the right workspace
was seated in the right chair and operated the right response
(“M”-) key (Figure 1A). Both participants were instructed to
put their right index finger on the respective response key
while leaving their left hand underneath the table on their left
thigh.
To familiarize participants with the task, the experiment
started with an instruction phase (∼5 min) including the
presentation of the two stimuli, their assignment to each
participant and a training of 16 trials in total. After the
instruction phase was completed, the experimental phase of
Task 1 started. There were two blocks of 128 trials, which
equally often contained each stimulus (blue vs. green) with
each S–R mapping (compatible vs. incompatible). This task was
used to calculate the individual reaction time (RT) threshold
for performance-contingent reward receipt in Task 2 and Task
3. The threshold was determined by the 0.33-quantile of all
correct responses sorted from fast to slow (cf., Fröber and
Dreisbach, 2014, 2016). To maintain vigilance throughout the
whole experiment, short self-paced breaks between blocks and a
2-min break between Task 1 and Task 2 outside the laboratory
were provided.
Following Task 1 and a recovering break, participants
reentered the lab to continue with the second segment, a joint go–
nogo Simon task with performance-contingent reward. In order
to keep S–R assignments and responsibilities consistent with Task
1, both participants were asked to take their respective seat of
either the left or the right workspace (counterbalanced across
pairs of participants). Thus, while the workspace remained the
same for one participant, the other had to change, but the spatial
assignment of chair and response-key remained the same (see
Figure 1B). After participants were reminded about stimuli and
respective assignments, they were instructed about the possibility
of earning four cents for every correct and very fast response (i.e.,
faster than the individual RT threshold) and irrespective of the
partner’s performance, to explicitly emphasize an independent
relationship between interacting individuals. Note, however, to
keep the task fair, a participant would lose two cents in case of
an error and the partner would gain these two cents, because an
error of one participant always represented a lost opportunity
for the other participant to gain reward. After the instruction,
participants performed 16 more training trials in order to get
familiar with the task and to give the participants a feeling
of about how fast they have to react to receive the reward.
Following this short training, participants got feedback about
the amount of money they would have received before the
experimental phase of Task 2 started. As in Task 1, participants
had to perform 256 testing trials divided in two blocks and they
received feedback about the earned amount of money after each
block.
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After Task 2, participants continued with the third segment,
again a joint go–nogo Simon task with performance-contingent
reward. The procedure was similar to the last task with
the following exception: In contrast to Task 2, the amount
of reward each participant received at the end of Task 3
depended upon the interactive mode, that is, whether participants
competed or cooperated. More precisely, in the cooperative
group, participants were instructed that the amount of reward
both participants earned during the course of the experiment will
be equally divided at the end of the experiment, thereby aiming to
emphasize to work as a team for a common goal. Consequentially,
error punishment was changed such that wrong responses still
led to a loss of two cents, but the amount was not added to the
partner’s score. In the competitive group, however, participants
were informed about “the winner takes it all principle,” aiming
to increase the challenge of receiving the desired goal. Thus,
the participant who earned the most during the course of the
experiment will receive not only her/his own reward but also
the amount of the reward earned by the co-actor. Accordingly,
error punishment was the same as in Task 2: Producing an error
resulted in a loss of two cents and a gain of two cents for the
opponent. After this instruction, the experimental phase started
immediately (i.e., without further training) with 256 testing trials,
divided into two blocks and a feedback about the earned amount
of money after each block (see Table 1 for an overview of the
experimental procedure).
Each trial of the different Simon tasks started with a fixation
cross in the center of the screen for 250 ms followed by the
imperative stimulus (i.e., a blue or a green circle) presented to
either the left or the right side of the screen for 1,000 ms or until a
response was given. If the response was correct and fast enough,
the next trial started after an inter-trial interval (ITI) varying
randomly between 500 ms and 1,200 ms in steps of 100 ms. If
not, the German words for error (i.e., “Falsch!”) or too slow (i.e.,
“Zu langsam!”) were displayed on the screen for 1,000 ms, thus
extending the ITI for about 1,500–2,200 ms in Task 1 and the
training trials of Task 2. There was no error feedback in the testing
trials of Task 2 or in Task 3.
After the three sessions of go–nogo Simon task performances,
participants were asked to complete three computerized
questionnaires at their own workspace, respectively. The first
questionnaire involved the “Inclusion of Other in the Self ”
(IOS) scale (Aron et al., 1992), a single-item pictorial measure
for perceived interpersonal connectedness. Here, participants
are asked to indicate which of the seven pictures best describes
their own relationship with the co-actor. The IOS was aimed
to provide a proof of concept for the interactive mode (i.e.,
competitive vs. cooperative) in Task 3. Following the IOS,
participants answered six questions about their focus of attention
(I fully concentrated on my own task in the last two blocks; In
the last two blocks of the experiment, I kept a close eye on the
other participant’s reaction; A sort of rhythm developed between
my reaction and the reaction of the other participant; I tried to
ignore the reaction of the other participant; The reaction of the
other participant strongly distracted me from my task; I strongly
concentrated on the other participant’s task). Participants could
answer on a five-point scale with possible answers “very true
for me,” “somewhat true for me,” “neutral,” “somewhat false for
me,” and “very false for me.” Those questions were intended
to measure the attentional focus of the subjects in Task 3. The
last questionnaire was the BIS/BAS Scale (Carver and White,
1994), which has 24 items in form of statements indicating
approach and avoidance motivation. Participants responded on
a four-point scale with “very true for me,” “somewhat true for
me,” “somewhat false for me,” or “very false for me.” The reward
responsiveness subscale of the behavioral approach system in
particular could influence participants in the rewarded Tasks 2
and 3.
Design
A 2 (CompatibilityN : compatible, incompatible) × 2
(CompatibilityN−1: compatible, incompatible) × 2 (Transition:
go–go, nogo–go) × 2 (Block: 1, 2) × 2 (Group: cooperation,
competition) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted for each of the three tasks. The within-subjects
factors were compatibility in the current trial (CompatibilityN),
compatibility in the previous trial (CompatibilityN−1), Transition
and Block, while Group was a between-subjects factor. In order
to investigate the impact of the specific interdependence (i.e.,
the in-/dependence) on interacting individuals in the go–nogo
Simon task, we included the within-subjects factor Task (2, 3)




For statistical analysis, we excluded the first trial of each block,
erroneous and post-error trials (together 3.2%) as well as trials
with RTs lower than 100 ms and RTs that were more than 3 SDs
from the individual cell mean (together 0.4%). Error rates were
rather low 1.3%, and were not analyzed further. The significance
criterion was set to p < 0.05.
RT Analysis for Task 1 (Individual
Go–Nogo)
The 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed no significant main
effect of CompatibilityN , F(1,43) = 1.42, p > 0.05. However,
there was a sequential adaptation effect as indicated by a
significant interaction of CompatibilityN and CompatibilityN−1,
F(1,43) = 93.61, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.69. The Simon effect was
smaller after incompatible than after compatible trials [−10
vs. 15 ms; t(44) = 9.57, p < 0.001, d = 1.54; for descriptive
details, see Table 2]. This interaction was further qualified by a
higher order interaction between Transition, CompatibilityN and
CompatibilityN−1, F(1,43) = 61.55, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.59. As can
be seen in Figure 2, this interaction can be explained by larger
sequential processing adjustments of the Simon effect for nogo–
go transitions than for go–go transitions [49 vs. 0 ms; t(44) = 7.76,
p < 0.001, d = 1.79]. The significant main effect of Block,
F(1,43) = 9.54, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.18, indicated that participants
responded faster in the first (M = 329, SD = 32) than in the
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FIGURE 2 | Simon effect (RTincompatible – RTcompatible) in ms as a function of CompatibilityN−1 (compatible, incompatible) and Transition (go–go, nogo–go) in the
individual go–nogo Simon task (1) and in the joint go–nogo Simon task (2) with independent reward. Error bars represent one standard error of the means.
TABLE 2 | Response times (SD) in milliseconds for compatible and incompatible
trials as a function of task (Individual go–nogo, Independent go–nogo, Dependent
go–nogo) and transition.
Compatible Incompatible
Individual go–nogo Simon task (Task 1)
Go–go transition
After compatible trial 329 (36) 329 (36)
After incompatible trial 328 (36) 328 (36)
Nogo–go transition
After compatible trial 325 (30) 354 (35)
After incompatible trial 347 (29) 327 (33)
Independent joint go–nogo Simon task
(Task 2) Go–go transition
After compatible trial 296 (29) 306 (30)
After incompatible trial 296 (28) 300 (29)
Nogo–go transition
After compatible trial 292 (27) 323 (25)
After incompatible trial 322 (29) 300 (29)
Dependent joint go–nogo Simon task
(Task 3) Cooperative group
Go–go transition
After compatible trial 296 (27) 305 (29)
After incompatible trial 295 (28) 299 (26)
Nogo–go transition
After compatible trial 295 (27) 334 (28)
After incompatible trial 326 (26) 303 (26)
Competitive group Go–go transition
After compatible trial 287 (27) 299 (29)
After incompatible trial 292 (28) 285 (26)
Nogo–go transition
After compatible trial 287 (27) 319 (28)
After incompatible trial 314 (26) 293 (26)
second block (M = 337, SD = 32). The significant main effect of
Transition, F(1,43) = 16.10, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.27, showed faster
RTs for go–go (M = 328, SD = 34) than for nogo–go transitions
(M = 338, SD = 30). This was further qualified by a significant
interaction between Block and Transition, F(1,43) = 25.49,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.37, revealing a larger Transition effect in the
second than in the first block [16 vs. 4 ms; t(44) = 5.09, p < 0.001,
d = 0.68]. The significant two-way interaction between Block and
CompatibilityN−1, F(1,43) = 6.94, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.14, indicated
faster RTs after incompatible trials compared to compatible
trials in block 2 than in block 1 [4 vs. −1 ms; t(44) = 1.16,
p < 0.05, d = 0.51]. The interaction between Transition and
CompatibilityN , F(1,43) = 4.56, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.10, showed a
larger Simon effect for nogo–go as compared to go–go transitions
[5 vs. 0 ms; t(44) = 2.17, p < 0.05, d = 0.33]. All other main
effects or interactions did not reach significance (all Fs < 3.11,
all ps > 0.084).
RT Analysis for Task 2 (Independent
Joint Go–Nogo)
The respective 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect of CompatibilityN , F(1,43) = 7.85, p< 0.01,
η2p = 0.15, indicating faster responses for compatible compared
to incompatible trials (Mcompatible = 301, SDcompatible = 27,
Mincompatible = 307, SDincompatible = 26). As in Task 1,
there was a sequential adaptation effect as indicated by a
significant interaction of CompatibilityN and CompatibilityN−1,
F(1,43) = 172.07, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.80, with a smaller Simon
effect after incompatible than after compatible trials [−9 vs.
21 ms; t(44) = 12.96, p < 0.001, d = 1.90; Table 2], as well
as between CompatibilityN , CompatibilityN−1 and Transition,
F(1,43) = 41.94, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.49 (for a comparison between
Tasks, Supplementary Table S1). As can be seen in Figure 2,
the sequential processing adjustments were larger for nogo–
go compared to go–go transitions [54 vs. 7 ms; t(44) = 6.55,
p < 0.001, d = 1.64]. The significant main effect of Transition,
F(1,43) = 34.28, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.44, showing faster RTs for go–
go (M = 300, SD = 27) than for nogo–go transitions (M = 309,
SD = 24), varied as a function of Block, F(1,43) = 13.37, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.24, such that there was a smaller Transition effect in
block 1 as compared to block 2 [5 vs. 14 ms; t(44) = 3.69,
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FIGURE 3 | Simon effect (RTincompatible – RTcompatible) in ms as a function of CompatibilityN−1 (compatible, incompatible), Transition (go–go, nogo–go), and Group
(Cooperation, Competition) in the joint go–nogo Simon task (3) with dependent reward (Cooperation: Equally divided, Competition: “the winner takes it all”). Error
bars represent one standard error of the means.
p < 0.01, d = 0.65]. The interaction between Transition and
CompatibilityN−1, F(1,43) = 6.37, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.13, indicated
faster RTs after compatible trials compared to incompatible trials
for nogo–go transitions than for go–go transitions [4 vs. −3 ms;
t(44) = 2.55, p < 0.05, d = 0.59]. Furthermore, the interaction
between Block, CompatibilityN−1 and Group, F(1,43) = 4.09,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.09, was significant, indicating larger RT-
differences after compatible trials compared to incompatible
trials between blocks in both the competitive and the cooperative
group [6 ms vs. 3 ms; t(43) = 2.02, p < 0.05, d = 0.60]. No other
main effects or interactions reached significance (all Fs< 2.24, all
ps > 0.142).
RT Analysis for Task 3 (Dependent Joint
Go–Nogo)
In the RT analysis of task 3, a significant main effect of
CompatibilityN was observed, F(1,43) = 8.40, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.16, indicating faster responses for compatible than
for incompatible trials (Mcompatible = 299, SDcompatible = 25,
Mincompatible = 305, SDincompatible = 25; Table 2). The interaction
between CompatibilityN and CompatibilityN−1, F(1,43) = 145.02,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.77, with a smaller Simon effect after
incompatible than after compatible trials [−12 vs. 23 ms;
t(44) = 12.14, p < 0.001, d = 2.22], and the interaction
between CompatibilityN , CompatibilityN−1 and Transition,
F(1,43) = 71.64, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.63, with larger sequential
processing adjustments for nogo–go compared to go–go
transitions [58 vs. 12 ms; t(44) = 8.19, p < 0.001, d = 1.69],
were further qualified by a higher order interaction between
CompatibilityN , CompatibilityN−1, Transition, and Group,
F(1,43) = 4.60, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.10. As can be seen in Figure 3,
this four-way interaction can be explained by a significant
sequential adaptation of the Simon effect for go–go transitions
in the competition group [20 ms; F(21) = 11.38, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.35], but non-significant sequential adaptation of the Simon
effect for go–go transitions in the cooperative group [5 ms;
F(22) = 0.63, p = 0.438]. There was a smaller Simon effect
after incompatible trials than after compatible trials for go–go
transitions in the competitive group [−7 vs. 13 ms; t(21) = 3.37,
p < 0.01, d = 1.04], but not in the cooperative group [4 vs.
9 ms; t(22) = 0.79, p = 0.438], and a smaller Simon effect
after incompatible trials than after compatible trials for nogo–go
transitions in the competitive group [−22 vs. 32 ms; t(21) = 10.11,
p < 0.001, d = 2.99] and the cooperative group [−24 vs. 39 ms;
t(22) = 14.37, p < 0.001, d = 4.17]. However, the interaction
between Compatibility and Group did not reach significance
[F(1,43) = 0.66, p > 0.05]. Furthermore, the main effect of
the Transition reached significance, F(1,43) = 44.41, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.51, suggesting faster RTs for go–go (M = 295, SD = 24)
than for nogo–go transitions (M = 309, SD = 25). The interaction
between Transition and CompatibilityN−1, F(1,43) = 4.11,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.09, indicated faster RTs after incompatible trials
compared to compatible trials for go–go transitions than for
nogo–go transitions [4 vs. 0 ms; t(44) = 2.05, p < 0.05, d = 0.41].
All other main effects or interactions were not significant (all
Fs < 3.66, all ps > 0.062).
Between-Task Analysis and
Questionnaires
Although the go–nogo Simon effect increased as a function
of the interdependence of interacting individuals –
competition < independence < cooperation (Figure 4) –
the respective interaction between the factors CompatibilityN ,
Group and Task did not reach significance, F(1,43) = 1.82,
p = 0.184 (Supplementary Table S2). The rest of this analysis’
results brought no further information to the findings detailed
above. In the analyses of the questionnaires, T-tests showed
no significant difference between groups on the IOS scale, the
mean response to the strategy questions, or the BAS reward
responsiveness score (all ts < 0.52, all ps > 0.604). Furthermore,
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FIGURE 4 | Simon effect (RTincompatible – RTcompatible) in ms for all conditions (Task 1: Individual, Task 3: Competition, Task 2: Independence, Task 3: Cooperation).
Error bars represent one standard error of the means.
there were no significant Spearman correlations between
Group, IOS response, mean Strategy response and BAS reward
responsiveness (all ps > 0.689).
DISCUSSION
The present research investigated the influence of in-/dependence
on interacting individuals in joint go–nogo Simon tasks. More
precisely, reward prospect for each (fast and correct) trial for each
participant was context-dependently manipulated to enable the
instantiation of different interdependencies between co-acting
participants. That is, participants were, prior to the joint go–nogo
Simon task, instructed that (i) each participant of the pair would
receive the amount of reward that s/he actually earned for fast
and correct responses on their own (i.e., independent reward)
or (ii) that the amount of reward would be equally divided
between both participants (cooperative dependence) or (iii) that
the participant that earned the most reward would receive
the whole amount of reward, including the amount earned by
the other person (competitive dependence). Extending previous
findings, the present study revealed sequential processing
adjustments of the go–nogo Simon effect as a function
of the interdependency of (i.e., competition, cooperation)
and transition between interacting individuals (i.e., go–nogo
requirements). While sequential processing adjustments of the
Simon effect in both the competition and cooperation condition
were unaffected when alternating between responsible actors
(i.e., nogo–go transition), sequential processing adjustments
were enlarged under competition for repeating responsibilities
of one and the same actor (i.e., go–go transitions). In other
words, the prospect of performance-contingent reward in
a competitive context exclusively impacts flexible behavioral
adjustments of one’s own actions. Rather than fostering the
consideration and differentiation of the other actor (i.e., other-
referenced frame), pushing one’s own performance to the limit
appears to be the suitable strategy in competitive instances
of complementary tasks (i.e., self-referenced frame; Poortvliet
and Darnon, 2010). Therefore, people keep their eyes on
themselves when aiming at beating a co-actor and emerging as the
winner.
Even though the present findings provide further valuable
insight into the mechanisms driving flexible adjustments to
changing contextual challenges when interacting with others
(Liepelt et al., 2011; Yamaguchi et al., 2016), two critical aspects
need further elaboration to close the gaps in the literature. One
concerns the obviously crucial role of defining in-/dependence,
and the other why the present study failed to show a modulation
of the joint go–nogo Simon effect as a consequence of the
interdependency of interacting individuals beyond the sequential
trial-to-trial processing adjustments. First, how in-/dependence
is defined appears to be particularly important for how attention
is deployed. Ruys and Aarts (2010) found a JSE difference
between dependence and independence, but no difference
between the dependent conditions (cooperation, competition).
In contrast, in our study, the sequential processing adjustments
indicate a different attentional focus between cooperation and
competition. In this way, the findings are in line with the
study of Iani et al. (2011) as well as Ruissen and de Bruijn
(2016), which show a distinction between cooperative and
competitive dependence on the level of the JSE. An explanation
for this inconsistency lies in the rather vague definitions of
cooperation and competition in the study of Ruys and Aarts
(2010). While they manipulated competition by rewarding 10
randomly selected team winners, Iani et al. (2011) improved this
manipulation by rewarding one winner within each team. This
distinction could explain the discrepancy of the JSE modulations
between the different studies. However, only the present
study shaped the cooperative relationship without alluding to
unspecified other teams, while in the study of Iani et al. (2011)
as well as Ruys and Aarts (2010), reward was given to the
best performing team, which induced a competitive relationship
with other teams. In this aspect, the present definition
covers the complex construct of cooperative interaction in a
proper way by solely manipulating the relationship within the
team.
More interestingly, however, the modulation of the JSE
as a consequence of the interdependency manipulation found
by Iani et al. (2011) and by Ruissen and de Bruijn (2016)
did not reach significance in the present study, even though
descriptively the results point in the same direction of a smaller
JSE in the competitive as compared to the cooperative group
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FIGURE 5 | Simon effect (RTincompatible – RTcompatible) in ms as a function of the mean reaction time in previous studies using visual joint go–nogo Simon tasks (for
more details see “Discussion” and Footnote 1). The red data points represent the results of the joint conditions of the present study (from left to right: Task 3:
Competition, Task 2: Independence, Task 3: Cooperation).
(Figure 4). One reasonable explanation concerns the specific
reward manipulations in the present study. Highlighting the
significance of each trial via reward prospect for each correct
and fast enough trial (i.e., each response in the fastest third of
all correct RTs in the individual go–nogo Task 1) seems to have
pushed task performance to the ceiling, leading overall as well
as within each task to decreasing RTs and smaller JSEs, and thus
to not much room for significant variability. Interestingly, this
observation stands in sharp contrast to what is typically found
for the standard (i.e., two choice) Simon task, namely increasing
Simon effects with decreasing RTs (Hommel, 1993). Even though
Hommel et al. (2009) use this pattern of a standard Simon task to
reject the possibility that the non-significant JSE in the negative
relationship condition, where participants reacted alongside an
intimidating confederate, is solely driven by response speed,
the attenuation of the JSE with decreasing RTs is perfectly in
line with the present and previous findings. The Google scholar
citation index for the initial JSE study of Sebanz et al. (2003)
on April 1st 2018 revealed 17 viable studies that used a visual
joint go–nogo Simon task with two participants sitting next to
and sharing the same workspace with each other (Figure 5)3.
The positive correlation of r = 0.52 (p < 0.01) indicates that
3Used studies (in alphabetic order): Colzato et al. (2012a): Independent group,
interdependent group; Colzato et al. (2013): Convergent group, divergent group;
Dittrich et al. (2012) and Costantini et al. (2013): Experiment 2 (horizontal joint
go–nogo condition), Experiment 3 (horizontal joint go–nogo condition); Dittrich
et al. (2017): Partition group, no partition group; Ferraro et al. (2011): Experiment
1; Hommel et al. (2009): Positive confederate, negative confederate; Iani et al.
(2011): Experiment 1 (same group, different group), Experiment 2 (positive
interdependence, negative interdependence); Iani et al. (2014): Experiment 1,
Experiment 2; Klempova and Liepelt (2017): Experiment 1 (joint go–nogo
condition), experiment 2 (joint go–nogo condition); Lam and Chua (2010):
Joint go–nogo different alternative condition; Liepelt et al. (2011), Malone et al.
(2014), and Ruissen and de Bruijn (2016): Solo condition, competitive condition,
cooperative condition; Sebanz et al. (2003): Experiment 1, Experiment 2 (no
feedback group); Stenzel et al. (2014): Experiment 1 (agency+/intentionality+
condition); Yamaguchi et al. (2016).
smaller RTs were predictive of smaller JSEs. Thus, in contrast to
Hommel et al. (2009) and the findings in a standard Simon task
showing increasing Simon effects with decreasing RTs (Hommel,
1993), go–nogo Simon effects are attenuated with increasing
RTs, suggesting the involvement of different processes in the
emergence of those two effects. In a standard Simon task with
two different stimulus features and two response alternatives,
the irrelevant spatial feature of the stimulus overlaps with the
spatial feature of the response and is considered to automatically
activate a representation of the spatially corresponding response.
Interestingly, if participants react more slowly, response code
activation induced by the location, which may conflict with the
correct response, seems to decay over time, leading to smaller
Simon effects (Hommel, 1994). If participants try to maximize
performance and react as fast as possible, conflict resolution in
a two-choice task takes up extra time in incompatible trials,
thereby leading to larger Simon effects. In contrast, in a joint
go–nogo Simon task, there are substantially different processes at
play (Dolk and Prinz, 2016). Participants have only one response
key and need to respond to only one of two stimulus features,
thus a selective rather than a (two-) choice reaction is required
on any given trial. While one’s own alternative response hand
in the two-choice Simon task provides a reference for spatial
response coding that signifies spatial S–R overlap and thus
elaborated Simon effects, this attention allocation toward task
inherent S–R assignments seems to require a salient alternative
(social or non-social) event in the individual’s workspace (Dolk
et al., 2011, 2013, 2014). Accordingly, if the participant tries to
react as quickly as possible by applying top-down control to
primarily focus on one’s own task, this might be responsible
for smaller Simon effects with faster RTs. In any case, it will
be important for future work to clarify the different underlying
processes that govern the emergence of the standard and the
(joint) go–nogo Simon effect when performance is pushed to the
limit.
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The most noteworthy finding of the present study is that
the flexible adjustments of attention allocation differ based on
the dependencies of interacting individuals, as shown in the
four-way interaction between compatibility in the present trial,
compatibility in the last trial, trial-to-trial transition, and group.
Sequential trial-by-trial processing adjustments were enlarged
under competition for repeating responsibilities of the same actor
(go–go transitions), which implies a stronger focus on one’s own
task. This self-focus may be an attempt to maximize performance
in order to have a higher chance of getting the reward. This
finding nicely converges with behavioral and electrophysiological
results of de Bruijn et al. (2008) showing that disengaging from
the partner can be beneficial for one’s own performance. Together
with the present result, these findings provide compelling
evidence against the view of Ruys and Aarts (2010) arguing that
the type of relationship between the participants is irrelevant
for the emergence of shared representations and, as long as
there is interdependence, participants attend to the partner’s
performance. Compared to the finding of Ruissen and de Bruijn
(2016) as well as Iani et al. (2011), who observed differences
on the level of the JSE, the present findings provide an even
more complex distinction of different types of interdependencies
between interacting individuals derived by attention allocation,
namely a stronger focus on one’s own performance under
competition. This interplay between attention allocation and the
size of the JSE is perfectly in line with various experiments.
For example, Colzato et al. (2012a) found that participants,
whose attention was drawn to interdependence by circling
interdependent pronouns (e.g., we, our) in essays, show a larger
JSE compared to participants with a self-centered focus after
having circled independent pronouns (e.g., I, me). Similarly,
Colzato et al. (2013) found a larger JSE in a group of participants
after a divergent thinking task, which lead to a broader attentional
focus, compared to a convergent thinking task that promoted an
exclusive cognitive-control state. All of those findings support
the view, that, if the context at hand enables one narrowing the
focus to one’s own task, the JSE is typically decreased. As such,
the (joint) go–nogo Simon task appears to be a viable tool to
investigate flexible adjustments of attention allocation governing
self-other integration when interacting with others (cf. Colzato
et al., 2012a,b; Dolk et al., 2012, 2013, 2014).
CONCLUSION
Taken together, the present study demonstrates that participants
flexibly adjust their allocation of attention based on the in-
/dependence of receiving performance-contingent reward when
interacting with others and thus to the contextual specificity
of social interactions. Rather than fostering the consideration
and differentiation of the other person, as happens when the
relationship is characterized by cooperative dependence, pushing
one’s own performance to the limit appears to be the suitable
strategy in a competitive context. Therefore, people keep their
eyes on themselves when aiming at beating a co-actor and
emerging as the winner.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
All authors contributed equally to study design, data analysis,
drafts and revisions of the manuscript. In addition, JM was
responsible for data collection.
FUNDING
This work was supported by the German Research Foundation
(DFG) within the funding program Open Access Publishing.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL




Aron, A., Aron, E. N., and Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of other in the self scale
and the structure of interpersonal closeness. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 63, 596–612.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.596
Baess, P., and Prinz, W. (2015). My partner is also in my mind: social context-
driven modulation of the visual N1 response. Exp. Brain Res. 233, 105–113.
doi: 10.1007/s00221-014-4092-9
Botvinick, M. W. (2007). Conflict monitoring and decision making:
reconciling two perspectives on anterior cingulated function.
Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 7, 356–366. doi: 10.3758/CABN.7.
4.356
Botvinick, M. W., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., and Cohen, J. D.
(2001). Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychol. Rev. 108, 624–652.
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.108.3.624
Carver, C. S., and White, T. L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral
activation, and af-fective responses to impending reward and punishment: The
BIS/BAS Scales. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 67, 319–333. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.67.
2.319
Colzato, L. S., de Bruijn, E., and Hommel, B. (2012a). Up to “me”
or up to “us”? The impact of self-construal priming on cognitive
self-other integration. Front. Psychol. 3:341. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.
00341
Colzato, L. S., Zech, H., Hommel, B., Verdonschot, R., van den
Wildenberg, W., and Hsieh, S. (2012b). Loving-kindness brings
loving-kindness: The impact of Buddhism on cognitive self– other
integration. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 19, 541–545. doi: 10.3758/s13423-012-
0241-y
Colzato, L. S., van den Wildenberg, W., and Hommel, B. (2013). Increasing
self-other integration through divergent thinking. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 20, 1011–
1016. doi: 10.3758/s13423-013-0413-4
Costantini, M., Di Vacri, A., Chiarelli, A. M., Ferri, F., Romani, G. L., and Merla, A.
(2013). Studying social cognition using near-infrared spectroscopy: the case
of social Simon effect. J. Biomed. Opt. 18:25005. doi: 10.1117/1.JBO.18.2.02
5005
Craft, J. L., and Simon, J. R. (1970). Processing symbolic information from a visual
display: interference from an irrelevant directional cue. J. Exp. Psychol. 83,
415–420. doi: 10.1037/h0028843
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 August 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1361
fpsyg-09-01361 August 2, 2018 Time: 11:26 # 12
Mendl et al. Interdependency and the Go–Nogo Simon
de Bruijn, E. R., Miedl, S. F., and Bekkering, H. (2008). Fast
responders have blinders on: ERP correlates of response inhibition
in competition. Cortex 44, 580–586. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2007.
09.003
Dittrich, K., Bossert, M., Rothe-Wulf, A., and Klauer, K. C. (2017). The joint
flanker effect and the joint Simon effect: on the comparability of processes
underlying joint compatibility effects. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 70, 1808–1823. doi:
10.1080/17470218.2016.1207690
Dittrich, K., Rothe, A., and Klauer, K. C. (2012). Increased spatial salience in
the social Simon task: a response-coding account of spatial compatibility
effects. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 74, 911–929. doi: 10.3758/s13414-012-
0304-1
Dolk, T., Hommel, B., Colzato, L. S., Schütz-Bosbach, S., Prinz, W., and Liepelt, R.
(2011). How “social” is the social Simon effect? Front. Psychol. 2:84. doi: 10.
3389/fpsyg.2011.00084
Dolk, T., Hommel, B., Colzato, L. S., Schütz-Bosbach, S., Prinz, W.,
and Liepelt, R. (2014). The joint Simon effect: a review and
theoretical integration. Front. Psychol. 5:974. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.
00974
Dolk, T., Hommel, B., Prinz, W., and Liepelt, R. (2013). The (not so) social Simon
effect: a referential coding account. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 39,
1248–1260. doi: 10.1037/a0031031
Dolk, T., Liepelt, R., Villringer, A., Prinz, W., and Ragert, P. (2012). Morphometric
gray matter differences of the medial frontal cortex influence the social
Simon effect. Neuroimage 61, 1249–1254. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.
03.061
Dolk, T., and Prinz, W. (2016). “What it takes to share a task: Sharing
versus shaping task representations,” in Shared Representations: Sensorimotor
Foundations of Social Life, eds S. S. Obhi and E. S. Cross (New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press), 3–21. doi: 10.1017/CBO97811072793
53.002
Egner, T. (2014). Creatures of habit (and control): a multi-level learning perspective
on the modulation of congruency effects. Front. Psychol. 5:1247. doi: 10.3389/
fpsyg.2014.01247
Ferraro, L., Iani, C., Mariani, M., Milanese, N., and Rubichi, S. (2011). Facilitation
and interference components in the joint Simon task. Exp. Brain Res. 211,
337–343. doi: 10.1007/s00221-011-2711-2
Fröber, K., and Dreisbach, G. (2014). The differential influences of positive
affect, random reward, and performance-contingent reward on cognitive
control. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 14, 530–547. doi: 10.3758/s13415-014-
0259-x
Fröber, K., and Dreisbach, G. (2016). How sequential changes in reward
magnitude modulate cognitive flexibility: evidence from voluntary task
switching. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 42, 285–295. doi: 10.1037/xlm00
00166
Gratton, G., Coles, M. G. H., and Donchin, E. (1992). Optimizing
the use of information: Strategie control of activation of responses.
J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 121, 480–506. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.121.
4.480
Guagnano, D., Rusconi, E., and Umiltà, C. A. (2010). Sharing a task or
sharing space? On the effect of the confederate in action coding in
a detection task. Cognition 114, 348–355. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.
10.008
Hommel, B. (1993). The relationship between stimulus processing and response
selection in the Simon task: Evidence for a temporal overlap. Psychol. Res. 55,
280–290. doi: 10.1007/BF00419688
Hommel, B. (1994). Spontaneous decay of response-code activation. Psychol. Res.
56, 261–268. doi: 10.1007/BF00419656
Hommel, B., Colzato, L. S., and van den Wildenberg, W. P. (2009). How social are
task representations? Psychol. Sci. 20, 794–798. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.
02367.x
Hommel, B., Müsseler, J., Aschersleben, G., and Prinz, W. (2001). The
theory of event coding (TEC): A framework for perception and action
planning. Behav. Brain Sci. 24, 849–878. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X010
00103
Iani, C., Anelli, F., Nicoletti, R., Arcuri, L., and Rubichi, S. (2011). The role of group
membership on the modulation of joint action. Exp. Brain Res. 211, 439–445.
doi: 10.1007/s00221-011-2651-x
Iani, C., Anelli, F., Nicoletti, R., and Rubichi, S. (2014). The carry-over effect of
competition in task-sharing: evidence from the joint Simon task. PLoS One
9:e97991. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0097991
Klempova, B., and Liepelt, R. (2017). Barriers to success: physical separation
optimizes event-file retrieval in shared workspaces. Psychol. Res. doi: 10.1007/
s00426-017-0886-2 [Epub ahead of print].
Kornblum, S., Hasbroucq, T., and Osman, A. (1990). Dimensional
overlap: cognitive basis for stimulus-response compatibility–a model
and taxonomy. Psychol. Rev. 97, 253–270. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.97.
2.253
Lam, M. Y., and Chua, R. (2010). Influence of stimulus–response assignment on
the joint-action correspondence effect. Psychol. Res. 74, 476–480. doi: 10.1007/
s00426-009-0269-4
Liepelt, R., Wenke, D., and Fischer, R. (2013). Effects of feature integration in a
hands-crossed version of the social Simon paradigm. Psychol. Res. 77, 240–248.
doi: 10.1007/s00426-012-0425-0
Liepelt, R., Wenke, D., Fischer, R., and Prinz, W. (2011). Trial-to-trial sequential
dependencies in a social and non-social Simon task. Psychol. Res. 75, 366–375.
doi: 10.1007/s00426-010-0314-3
Lu, C. H., and Proctor, R. W. (1995). The influence of irrelevant location
information on performance: a review of the Simon and spatial
Stroop effects. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 2, 174–207. doi: 10.3758/BF032
10959
Malone, M., Castillo, R. D., Kloos, H., Holden, J. G., and Richardson, M. J.
(2014). Dynamic structure of joint-action stimulus-response activity. PLoS One
9:e89032. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0089032
Müller, B. C., Kühn, S., van Baaren, R. B., Dotsch, R., Brass, M., and Dijksterhuis, A.
(2011). Perspective taking eliminates differences in co-representation of out-
group members’ actions. Exp. Brain Res. 211, 423–428. doi: 10.1007/s00221-
011-2654-7
Poortvliet, P. M., and Darnon, C. (2010). Toward a more social understanding
of achievement goals: The interpersonal effects of mastery and performance
goals. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 19, 324–328. doi: 10.1177/096372141038
3246
Quintard, V., Jouffre, S., Croizet, J. C., and Bouquet, C. A. (2018). The influence
of passionate love on self-other discrimination during joint action. Psychol. Res.
doi: 10.1007/s00426-018-0981-z [Epub ahead of print].
Ruissen, M. I., and de Bruijn, E. R. (2016). Competitive game play attenuates
self-other integration during joint task performance. Front. Psychol. 7:274. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00274
Ruys, K. I., and Aarts, H. (2010). When competition merges people’s behavior:
Interdependency activates shared action representations. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.
46, 1130–1133. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2010.05.016
Sebanz, N., Knoblich, G., and Prinz, W. (2003). Representing others’ actions:
just like one’s own? Cognition 88, B11–B21. doi: 10.1016/S0010-0277(03)00
043-X
Simon, J. R. (1990). “The effects of an irrelevant directional cue on human
information processing,” in Stimulus Response Compatibility: An Integrated
Perspective. Advances in Psychology, Vol. 65, eds R. W. Proctor and T. G. Reeve
(Oxford: North-Holland), 31–86.
Simon, J. R., and Rudell, A. P. (1967). Auditory S-R compatibility: The effect
of an irrelevant cue on information processing. J. Appl. Psychol. 51, 300–304.
doi: 10.1037/h0020586
Stenzel, A., Chinellato, E., Bou, M. A. T., del Pobil, A. P., Lappe, M., and
Liepelt, R. (2012). When humanoid robots become human-like interaction
partners: corepresentation of robotic actions. J. Exp. Psychol.Hum. Percept.
Perform. 38, 1073–1077. doi: 10.1037/a0029493
Stenzel, A., Dolk, T., Colzato, L. S., Sellaro, R., Hommel, B., and Liepelt, R. (2014).
The joint Simon effect depends on perceived agency, but not intentionality, of
the alternative action. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:595. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.
00595
Tsai, C. C., and Brass, M. (2007). Does the human motor system simulate
Pinocchio’s actions? Coacting with a human hand versus a wooden hand in a
dyadic interaction. Psychol. Sci. 18, 1058–1062. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.
02025.x
Tsai, C. C., Kuo, W. J., Hung, D. L., and Tzeng, O. J. (2008). Action co-
representation is tuned to other humans. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 20, 2015–2024.
doi: 10.1162/jocn.2008.20144
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 August 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1361
fpsyg-09-01361 August 2, 2018 Time: 11:26 # 13
Mendl et al. Interdependency and the Go–Nogo Simon
Van Vugt, M., Cremer, D. D., and Janssen, D. P. (2007). Gender
differences in cooperation and competition: The male-warrior
hypothesis. Psychol. Sci. 18, 19–23. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01
842.x
Watzlawick, P., Bavelas, J. B., and Jackson, D. D. (1967). Pragmatics of human
communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies and Paradoxes.
New York, NY: WW Norton & Company.
Yamaguchi, M., Wall, H. J., and Hommel, B. (2016). Sharing tasks or sharing
actions? Evidence from the joint Simon task. Psychol. Res. 80, 1–10. doi: 10.
1007/s00426-016-0821-y
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2018 Mendl, Fröber and Dolk. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication
in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 August 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1361
